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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No.

Vv

:

Priority No. 2

SIMONE LUCIA KENT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

960606-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a judgment and conviction pursuant to
a conditional guilty plea to one count of computer crimes, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703
(1995).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §

78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court correctly rule that the computer
crimes statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995) , did not contain
the same elements or proscribe the same conduct as Utah's
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud statutes?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following rules, statutes, and
constitutional provisions is attached in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-501 (1995)/
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 17, 1995, defendant was charged by information
with two counts of computer crimes, second degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995) (R. 01-03).
Defendant moved to strike the computer crimes statute as being
unconstitutional on the ground that it proscribed the same
conduct as Utah's forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
fraud statutes, but imposed a harsher penalty (R. 20-24).

The

trial court denied defendant's motion on the ground that the
elements of the four statutes were distinguishable (R. 75-76).
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of computer crimes, expressly reserving the right to appeal
the trial court's denial of her constitutional and statutory
challenge (R. 47, 50, 76-77).

The trial court accepted the plea

and sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in prison, stayed
2

on the condition that defendant successfully complete 36 months
of probation (R. 59, 91). Defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal (R. 65).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime from March 2, through March 9, 1995, defendant
Simone Kent used another employee's password to access the
computer system of her employer, First Health, and to alter two
insurance claim forms on the system (R. 02-03).

Defendant's

alterations resulted in two checks, one for $3500.00 and one for
$7500.00, being issued and mailed to Cathleen Gullett at a post
office box that defendant had rented using Gullett's driver's
license (R. 02-03) . First Health discovered the scheme and
notified authorities of the unauthorized checks (R. 02-03) .
Defendant was arrested as she retrieved the $3500.00 check from
the post office box (R. 02-03).
The State charged defendant with two counts of computer
crimes (R. 01-02).

The first count was based on the issuance of

the $3500.00 check, while the second count referred to the
issuance of the $7500.00 check (R. 01-02).

After the trial court

denied defendant's motion to strike the computer crimes statute,
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the first count
3

(R. 47, 50, 76-77).

In exchange for defendant's plea# the State

agreed to dismiss the second count (R. 77).
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Point I,

The computer crimes statute, under which defendant

was charged and convicted, does not proscribe the same conduct as
the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud statutes.
Each of the four statutes was intended to target distinct conduct
and each contains elements that are separate and distinct from
the others. Therefore, defendant's equal protection and due
process rights were not violated, and the trial court properly
denied her motion to strike the computer crimes statutes.
Point II. Defendant waived her argument that she is
entitled to a lesser penalty merely because the mental
culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
fraud equals or exceeds the mental culpability required by the
computer crimes statute.

Even if she did not waive this

argument, the case law she relies on does not support her
position.
Point III. Even though an act violates more than one
statute, the misconduct may be subject to the more severe penalty
so long as the legislative classification is not arbitrary and

4

there is a rational basis for the distinction.

There is a

rational basis for punishing a computer crime more severely than
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud.
crimes are easy to commit and difficult to detect.

Computer
Furthermore,

the computer crimes statutes applies more specifically to
defendant's conduct in this case than do the other three
statutes.

Indeed, the factual record indicates that the elements

of forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud could not
have been proven in this case.
ARGUMENT
Defendant makes three arguments on appeal.

First, defendant

asserts that the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
fraud statutes all proscribe the same conduct as the statute
under which she was convicted and that she is therefore entitled
to the lesser penalty imposed by those statutes.

Second,

defendant argues that she is entitled to the lesser penalties of
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud because the
requisite mental culpability of those crimes equals or exceeds
the requisite mental culpability for computer crimes.

Third,

defendant contends that because her conduct is also punishable
under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud, she
is entitled to the lesser penalty imposed by those statutes.
5

Otherwise, defendant asserts, the prosecutor would be permitted
to choose whether to charge her with a second or a third degree
felony, thereby denying her equal protection under the law.
The State addresses each of defendant's contentions in
order.
POINT I
BECAUSE THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE DOES NOT HAVE THE
SAME ELEMENTS AS UTAH'S POROERY, COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD,
OR INSURANCE FRAUD STATUTES, THESE STATUTES DO NOT
PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT AND DEFENDANT COULD PROPERLY
BE CONVICTED UNDER THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE.
Defendant asserts that the computer crimes statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995), proscribes the same conduct as that
proscribed in the forgery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1995) ; the insurance fraud statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521
(1995)/ and the communications fraud statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1) (1995).

Defendant argues that this violates her

equal protection and due process rights because the computer
crimes statute, under which she was charged and convicted,
carries a harsher penalty than the other statutes.1

Computer crimes is a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-703(3), whereas at the time defendant was sentenced forgery,
insurance fraud, and communications fraud were all third degree
felonies, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(3) (1995 & Supp. 1995); 766-521(2) (b) (1995); 76-10-1801 (1) (c) (1995 & Supp. 1995).
6

Under State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and its
progeny, if two statutes proscribe the same conduct but assess
different penalties, the defendant is entitled to receive the
lesser penalty.

Shondal. 453 P.2d at 147-48; gee alSQ State Y,

Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); ^f.af* v. Gomez. 722 P.2d
747, 749 (Utah 1986); at at a v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah

1981); gee also State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989).
Otherwise, the same conduct would be "subject to different
penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a
prosecutor chooses to charge."

Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263. That

would violate a defendant's right to equal protection under the
laws.

Id*, at 263; Shondel. 453 P.2d at 147; State v. TwitChell,

333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1959).
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative
as to the elements of the crime.1' Brya^r 709 P.2d at 263;
also Gomez. 722 P.2d at 749; Duran. 722 P.2d at 987.

see

If the

elements of the crimes are not identical and the two statutes
require "proof of some fact or element not required to establish
the other," they do not proscribe the same conduct and the
defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe
7

penalty.

Clark, 632 P.2d at 844; see alsofiQm&a,722 P.2d at

749-50; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 61 (Utah App. 1989),
cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)•
Thus, the issue here is whether the computer crimes statute
has the identical elements contained in the forgery,
communications fraud, and insurance fraud statutes. A comparison
of the individual statutes demonstrates that it does not.
A. The elements of the computer Crimea and forgery statutes
are not identical.

Although computer crimes and forgery fall within the same
general category of fraud crimes, they have separate and distinct
elements that proscribe very different conduct. A person is
guilty of a computer crime if he or she
uses or knowingly allows another person to use any
computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software to devise or
execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain
money, property, services, or other things of value by
false pretenses, promises, or representations, is
guilty of a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (1995).

Thus, the elements that the

State must prove to convict a defendant of computer crimes are:
1) a person must use or knowingly allow another person to use a
computer or computer system 2) to devise or execute an artifice
or scheme 3) to defraud or obtain money, services, property, or

8

something of value, 4) by false pretenses, promises, or
representations.
In comparison, forgery consists of the following:
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:

(b) makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the
making, completion, execution, authentication,
issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case,
or to be a copy of an original when no such
original exists.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1)(b) (1995).

Simply stated, the

elements of forgery relevant to this case are that one must 1)
1

I

with the intent to defraud 2) utter a writing 3) so that the
writing or the uttering of the writing purports to be that of
another or purports to have been executed at a time or place or
in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case.

For

purposes of the forgery statute, a writing includes "printing or
any other method of recording information, checks, tokens,
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification."

9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2) (1995).*
Each of these statutes requires proof of some fact or
element not required by the other.

Forgery requires the making,

completing, execution, authenticating, or the uttering of a
writing.

The computer crimes statute has no such requirement.

Forgery requires that the writing or the utterance of the writing
purport to be the act of another or purport to have been executed
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in

defendant states in her brief that the forgery statute
defines "writing" as including "electronic storage or
transmission." (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. App."] at
13). That language, however, was not added to the forgery
statute until April 29, 1996, more than a year after defendant
committed her crime, and five months after defendant was charged.
See Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1995 & Supp.
1996). Defendant clearly could not have been charged under the
1996 version of the forgery statute; therefore the definition of
"writing'1 existing at the time defendant committed her crimes
controls for purposes of comparing the elements of forgery and
computer crimes.
Although a statutory amendment may be applied retroactively
when enacted solely to clarify ambiguities in the law, D.B. v.
State. 925 P.2d 178, 182 n.5 (Utah App. 1996), "[t]his exception
carries a rebuttable presumption that amendments not expressly
characterized as clarifications are intended to change existing
legal rights and liabilities." Kofoed v. Industrial Comm'n. 872
P.2d 484, 486 (Utah App. 1994). The prior forgery statute was
not ambiguous as to the definition of a writing and the amendment
was not expressly characterized as a clarification. There is no
reason therefore to support the conclusion that the amendment was
merely a clarification.
Unless otherwise specified, all future references to
applicable statutes in the State's brief are to those versions
existing at the time defendant committed her crime.

10

fact the case. One may use a computer to steal without producing
any writing that purports to be the act of another or to have

I
been executed at a falsely stated time and place.

For example, a

person may access a computer system and wrongfully transfer funds
from another's account, or steal proprietary information, or, as
was done in this case, simply direct the computer to issue
unauthorized checks. None of these actions produces a writing as
defined by the applicable version of the forgery statute, let
alone a writing that purports to be the act of another.3
Finally, while a computer crime requires the use of a computer,
forgery can, and often is, committed without the use of a
computer.
Because both these statutes contain necessary elements not
shared by the other, they are not "wholly duplicative."
Bryan 709 P.2d at 263.
the same conduct.

See

These statues therefore do not proscribe

The trial court correctly ruled that defendant

defendant implies in her brief that the check issued by her
employer to Cathleen Gullett fulfills the "writing" requirement
of the forgery statute. While a check is a "writing" for
purposes of the forgery statute, in this case it was not a
writing that purported to be anything other than it was, a check
from First Health to Cathleen Gullett. Furthermore, defendant
did not make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, or utter
the check as required by the statute. Rather, by altering the
claim forms, she caused First Health to make and issue the check.

11

was not entitled to the lesser penalty under the forgery statute.
£L

Computer crimes and insurance fraud do not share

identical elementsThe elements of computer crimes are also very distinct from
the elements of a fraudulent insurance act*

To commit insurance

fraud one must 1) with the intent to defraud 2) present or cause
to be presented any oral or written representation 3) as part of
or in support of a claim for payment or other benefit 4) pursuant
to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, 5) knowing that
the representation contains false or fraudulent information
concerning any material fact or thing to the claim,
Ann. § 76-6-521(1)(b).4

Utah Code

Unlike insurance fraud, a computer crime

does not require that a false representation be presented in
support of a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy.
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521(1)(b) states in full:
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that
person with intent to defrauds
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral
or written statement or representation as part of
or in support of a claim for payment or other
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy,
certificate, or contract, or in connection with
any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages
for personal or bodily injuries or property
damage, knowing that the statement or
representation contains false or fraudulent
information concerning any fact or thing material
to the claim.

12

Indeed, a computer crime does not require any representation at
all.

Rather, to commit a computer crime, one must merely use a

computer to devise or execute a scheme to defraud another. That
may be accomplished without making any false representation and
without regard to the existence of a claim for payment pursuant
to an insurance policy or contract.

Insurance fraud, on the

other hand, does not make the use of a computer a necessary
element.
Also, by their terms, the computer crimes and insurance
fraud statutes target different criminal conduct.

The computer

crimes statute proscribes the use of a computer to defraud anyone
else.

The insurance fraud statute on the other hand aims to

punish those who file false claims with insurance companies
pursuant to insurance policies or contracts.
Because the elements of these two statutes are not
identical, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion.
C.

The elements of computer crimes and communications fraud

ar* not identical.

Although the computer crimes and communications fraud
statutes are similar and proscribe related conduct, their
elements are not "wholly duplicative."

Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263.

A person is guilty of communications fraud if he or she has

13

[1] devised any scheme or artifice [2] to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property or
anything of value [3] by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises or material
omissions, and [4] who communicates directly or
indirectly with any person [5] by any means [6] for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1).

For purposes of this statute, to

communicate wmeans to bestow, convey, make known, recount,
impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to
transmit information."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a). Means

of communication under this statute include, but are not limited
to, "use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television,
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication."

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (6) (b).
The most obvious difference between these two statutes is
that communications fraud requires a direct or indirect
communication with a person for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme to defraud another.

In contrast, the

computer crimes statute does not require any communication.

A

person can commit a computer crime without communicating anything
to anyone. As already mentioned, a person could access a
computer system and simply steal proprietary information, or
alter existing information to reflect that payment had been made

14

on a debt, or one could simply direct a computer by altering
existing information to issue checks or something else of value
i

to that person.

Such acts do not involve ^communicating directly

or indirectly with any person • . . for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme or artifice.1'
It is significant that computer crimes has as a necessary
element "the use of a computer" to defraud.

I

Although one may

I

commit communications fraud by communication via a computer, the
use of the computer is not an element of communications fraud.
Rather, it is only one of numerous ways that one can communicate
to another for the purpose of executing or concealing a
fraudulent scheme or artifice.
Because communications fraud and computer crimes do not
share the same elements, the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion that she be given the benefit of the lesser
penalty imposed by the communications fraud statute.

15

POINT IX
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HER ARGUMENT THAT UNDER STATE V,
fi&XAH SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE LESSER PENALTIES IMPOSED
BY FORGERY, INSURANCE FRAUD, AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
BECAUSE THEIR REQUISITE MENTAL CULPABILITY EQUALS OR
EXCEEDS THE MENTAL CULPABILITY REQUIRED FOR COMPUTER
CRIMES. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STATE V, BRYAN DOBS NOT
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT.
Relying on isolated language in State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d
257, 262 (Utah 1985), defendant argues that because the requisite
mental culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and
communications fraud equals or exceeds the mental culpability
required by the computer crimes statute, it would be more fair to
sentence her to the lesser penalty prescribed by the other
statutes.

Defendant waived this argument because she did not

raise it below, and, in any event, her argument is not supported

by Bryan.
A.

Defendant has waived this argument, because she did

not preserve it below.
When defendant moved the trial court to find the computer
crimes statute unconstitutional, she argued only that the
computer crimes, forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
fraud statutes punished equivalent acts and that this violated
her equal protection and due process rights (R. 20-23) • She made
no mention, let alone argument, that she was entitled to be

16

convicted of a third degree felony because the requisite mental
culpability for forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
I
I
fraud equals or exceeds that for computer crimes (R. 20-23).

As

a result, the trial court did not address this issue in making
its ruling (R. 75-76).
It is well settled that absent plain error or
exceptional circumstances, an appellate court will not address an
I
I
issue raised for the first time on appeal.

State v. Lopez, 886

P.2d 1105, 1113, (Utah 1994); State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568, 569
(Utah 1987); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986).

I
The purpose of this rule is to give the trial court an
opportunity to fully consider and correct an error that might be
I
claimed by appellant on appeal. Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 9596 (Utah 1986).
Defendant has not claimed plain error or any exceptional
I
circumstance that prohibited her from bringing this issue to the
attention of the trial court. Defendant has therefore waived the
issue and this Court should not address it.
B.

Bryan

does not support defendant'a argument!.

If the Court determines that defendant did not waive this
issue, it should nevertheless affirm the trial court because
defendant's argument is not supported by Bryan or any other
1?

authority.
Defendant asserts that the Utah Supreme Court in Bryan *has
recognized that the differences in the %grade' of offenses (i.e»
from class C to A misdemeanors, and third to first degree
felonies) are manifested by the increasingly culpable mental
states of the offenses.*
at 262.)

(Br. App. at 9, citing Bryan. 709 P.2d

Defendant bases this assertion on two sentences

appearing in Bryan; "Our justice system contemplates a series of
graded offenses that [are] distinguished by increasingly culpable
mental states.

If the State can prove that a defendant acted

with the more culpable mental state, the defendant can be
convicted of the higher offense."

id.

Defendant seems to

conclude from this language that if the mental culpability of a
criminal statute equals or exceeds the mental culpability of a
statute proscribing related conduct but imposing a harsher
penalty, the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty.

(Br.

App. at 9-10, 13, 15,17.)
The defendant in Bryan was convicted of manslaughter because
he caused the death of two young persons while driving
intoxicated.

Applying the Shonde], rule, the Court compared the

elements of manslaughter with the elements of negligent homicide
as defined in the criminal code [hereinafter "automobile
18

homicide"].

The Court held that manslaughter and automobile

homicide did not have identical elements because they each
i
i

required a different mens rea: manslaughter required recklessness
and automobile homicide required only criminal negligence,

id.

at 262. The Court explained that this difference required that
the State prove "something more than the elements of automobile
homicide to convict defendant of manslaughter."

id.

The Court

concluded that if the State could prove that the defendant acted
with the more culpable state, i.e., recklessness, then the
defendant could be convicted of the higher offense, i.e.,
manslaughter.

Id.

The Bryan Court then compared the elements of manslaughter
with the elements of negligent homicide as defined in the motor
vehicle

code

[hereinafter "negligent homicide"].

Id. at 263.

The Court concluded that the elements of the two statutes were
identical because each required the "reckless" killing of
another,

id.

Holding that this would impermissibly allow a

prosecutor to charge a felony or a misdemeanor, the Court held
that defendant was entitled to be sentenced under the lesser
offense.

Id. at 263-64.

The holding in Bryan rested solely on the rule in Shondel
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that when two statutes have identical elements, they proscribe
the same conduct and the defendant is entitled to the lesser
punishment,

id. at 262-63. The statement relied on by

defendant, that graded offenses are ^distinguished by
increasingly culpable mental states," was merely an explanation
regarding the distinction in that case between the manslaughter
and automobile homicide statutes,

id. at 262.

It was not

intended to state a blanket rule that all offenses are determined
solely by culpable mental states. Read in context, it was
certainly not intended to entitle a defendant to the lesser
penalty of two related statutes simply because the lesser offense
has a mental culpability that equals or exceeds the higher
offense.
Thus, under Bryan and Shondel. the only relevant inquiry
with respect to mental culpability is whether two statutes with
the same actus reus share the same mens rea.

Indeed, under

Shondel and Bryan, if the mental states of forgery, insurance
fraud, and communications fraud are greater than that required by
the computer crimes statutes, their elements are different and
they do not proscribe the same conduct.
Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER THE COMPUTER
CRIMES STATUTE EVEN IF HER CONDUCT WAS PUNISHABLE BY*
THE FORGERY, INSURANCE FRAUD, AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
STATUTES.
Defendant finally argues that her conduct is punishable
under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud
statutes, as well as the computer crimes statues. She asserts
that under Bryan and Shondel, this overlap permits a prosecutor,
in violation of equal protection, to charge her with either a
third degree felony under the computer crimes statute, or with a
second degree felony under the forgery, insurance fraud, or
communications fraud statues.

(Br. App. at 10-11, 14, 16, 17) .

Defendant also argues that the forgery, insurance fraud, and
communications fraud statutes are more specifically tailored to
the facts of this case than is the computer crimes statute and
that any doubt on this point should be resolved in her favor.
A. Even though an act mav violate more than one statutory
provision, a defendant mav be punished under the more severe

applicable penalty, S Q long as there is a rational basis for
the legislative clasaification.

The Utah Supreme Court has already considered and rejected
defendant's argument that because her conduct violates more than
one statutory provision, she is entitled to be convicted under
the lesser offense-

Clark. 632 P.2d at 843-44.
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In Clark, the

defendant was convicted of theft of livestock for stealing three
turkeys valued at $45.00. Clark's conduct was punishable under
both the theft of livestock statute and the theft statute.

Theft

of livestock was a third degree felony regardless of the value of
the livestock.

Theft, however, was a misdemeanor if the value of

the stolen property was less than $100.00. Clark argued, as the
defendant does here, that the provisions of the theft statue gave
a prosecutor discretion to charge defendant with either a
misdemeanor or a felony for the same act and that this violated
his right to equal protection under the law.

Id. at 843.

The Court rejected defendant's argument, holding that u[i]t
is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more severe
penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is
imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which
the special crime is related or of which it is a subcategory.1'
Id.

The Court explained that so long as the legislative

distinction is not arbitrary, "the fact that conduct may violate
both a general and a specific provision of the criminal laws does
not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one
violation is subject to a greater sentence."
People v. Burns. 593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1979).
elaborated:
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id. (citing to
The Clark Court

"Simply because an act may violate more than one
statutory provision does not invalidate the legislation
in question, so long as the legislative classification
is not arbitrary or unreasonable, and the differences
in the provisions bear a reasonable relationship to the
persons included and the public policy to be achieved."
IdL at 844 (quoting People Vt CzajkQWSki, 568 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo.
1977)).
The Court then concluded that the difference between the
penalties for theft of livestock and general theft crimes rested
on a "rational distinction" in that the "theft of certain animals
is one which has historically been recognized as furthering the
legitimate purpose of determining a type of theft easy to commit
and difficult to detect."

Id. at 843; see also Gomez. 722 P.2d

at 749-50 (distinction that "signing" of card or sales slip
should be punished more severely than mere fraudulent use of
financial transaction card was within legislative prerogative);
State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1982) (distinction
between destruction of public records by custodian of records and
destruction of public records by any person was a rational one);
Duran, 772 P.2d at 987 (distinction between assault by a prisoner
and assault of a peach officer by any person was "manifestly
rational").
Assuming, arguendo,

that defendant's conduct is also

23

punishable under the forgery, insurance fraud, and communications
fraud statutes, there is a rational basis for imposing a more
severe penalty for committing a computer crime.

Our society has

become increasingly dependent on the use of computers.

Computers

are used to store important data and to perform various necessary
financial and business functions.

Like theft of livestock, using

a computer to steal or defraud is easy to do and extremely
difficult to detect.

Forgery, insurance fraud, and

communications fraud, on the other hand, are, because of the
nature of their crimes, more easily detected.

For example,

forgery involves writings that can be examined and verified.

The

origins of forged documents can almost always be traced.
Insurance fraud requires a false representation in support of a
claim made pursuant to an existing policy.

The representations

in support of the claim can be verified and false statements can
easily be exposed.

In addition, it is an easy matter to trace

the source of false representations on claims.

Similarly,

communications fraud requires a communication to someone, thereby
providing a means of identifying the person perpetrating the
fraud.

In contrast, a computer crime is essentially a faceless

crime.

One can easily access a computer and steal something of

value with no one the wiser and with no way to identify the
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thief.

One can also afterward delete from the computer any

evidence of the wrongdoing.

Finally, the computer may also be

the means to defraud on a much grander scale than what otherwise
might be possible without the use of a computer.
For these reasons, the legislature reasonably placed a more
severe penalty for defrauding others by use of a computer.
Therefore, defendant could properly be charged and convicted
under the computer crimes statute, even though her conduct might
also be punishable under the lesser penalties for forgery,
insurance fraud, and communications fraud.
B. On the factual record of this cage, computer crimes
is the statute that most specifically applies to
defendant's conduct.

Defendant argues that her conduct is more specifically
covered by forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud,
than it is by computer crimes. Defendant further suggests that
any doubt about which statute applies to her conduct should be
resolved in her favor.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, computer crimes is the
statute that most specifically applies to her conduct.

Indeed,

it is the only statute whose elements are established by this
record.

The record clearly reflects that defendant used a

computer to execute a scheme to defraud her employer (R.02-03).
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Defendant does not dispute this, nor that her conduct falls
squarely under the computer crimes statute.
The record does not state, however, that defendant made or
uttered a writing purporting to be that of another.

The record

merely states that she accessed her employer's computer and
altered two claim forms (R. 02-03).

These facts do not tell us

that a "writing" purporting to be that of another was produced.
As already stated above in Point I, footnote 3, the check issued
as a result of defendant's misconduct did not purport to be the
writing of another or to be executed at a different time or
place.

In fact, there is no evidence that defendant made or

executed the check as required by the forgery statute.

The check

was produced by First Health as a result of defendant's altering
the claim forms. Also, the altering of forms on the computer
does not fit within the definition of a "writing" under the
forgery statute.

Even if it did, the facts on this record does

not tell us exactly how defendant altered the forms.

Thus, we do

not know whether that alteration resulted in a form that
purported to be that of another or to be executed at a different
time or place.

There is also nothing in the record that states

that anyone ever saw this purported "writing" by the defendant.
On these record facts, therefore, defendant could not have been
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convicted of forgery.
Similarly, the record facts of this case do not meet the
elements of insurance fraud.

A critical element of insurance

fraud is that a defendant present a false representation in

support of a claim pursuant to an insurance policy,
or contract.

certificate,

Nothing in the record of this case indicates that

defendant made a false representation when she directed the
computer to issue the two checks. The record merely states that
she altered two forms so that the checks would be issued and
mailed.5

The record does not reflect exactly what alterations

defendant made and whether those alterations entailed a false
representation or merely involved altering a code.
5

It is also

In the plea agreement, defendant admits to the following:
My conduct for which I am criminally liable, which
constitutes the elements of the crime charged is as
follows: I acknowledge and admit that on or about March
2, 1995 through March 9, 1995 in Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, Utah, I did commit Computer Crimes when I
used my position at my job at First Health to enter the
company's computer system and filed medical claims for
2 checks in the amounts of $3,800 and $7,600. I was
not entitled to those checks, and was caught by agents
of the FBI and Postal Inspectors Office when I tried to
pick up one of the checks as it was delivered to a post
office box which I had rented.
(R. 47-48). This statement still does not clarify exactly what
representations defendant made on the claim forms, if any,
whether those representations were false, and whether they were
made pursuant to an existing policy or contract.
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questionable whether accessing a computer and altering a claim
form on the computer amounts to a representation at all. There
is no evidence on this record that anyone actually read or saw
the claim forms that defendant altered or that they were ever
reduced to a written form.

The record also does not indicate

that defendant or anyone else made a claim pursuant to any
insurance policy, certificate, or contract.

Without more facts,

defendant could not have been convicted under the insurauice fraud
statute.
Finally, nothing on this record indicates that defendant
actually, either directly or indirectly, communicated, i.e.,
bestowed, conveyed, made known, recounted, imparted, gave by way
of information, talked over, or transmitted information, uwith
any person," as required by the communications fraud statute. A
computer can hardly be considered a person and under this record,
defendant merely input or altered data already in the computer.
Nothing in the record indicates that anyone read or saw that data
or that defendant communicated with any person for the purpose of
executing or covering up her fraud.

In the absence of such

evidence, the State could not have proven that defendant was
guilty of communications fraud.
In sum, on this record, computer crimes was the only statute
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under which defendant could have been convicted.

Even if this

Court were to find that defendant's conduct is punishable under
forgery, insurance fraud, or communications fraud, it should
nevertheless uphold defendant's conviction because of the four
statutes, the computer crimes statute is the most applicable, and
more importantly, the legislature had a rational basis for
imposing a more severe penalty for violating that statute.
CONCLUSION
Because the elements of computer crimes and forgery,
insurance fraud, and communications fraud are not the same, they
do not proscribe the same conduct.

This Court should affirm the

trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to strike the
computer crimes statute.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^2?day of March, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

76-6-501

CRIMINAL CODE

Kimbel 620 R2d 516 (Utah 1980).
Valuation of stolen property.
Where auto owner took his car from possesmon of TtpBirman by trick, or otherwise stole
special property of bailee, value was amount of
indebtedness; where thing stolen was written
instrument evidencing debt, its value was determined by amount remaining unpaid
thereon. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23,137 P.2d
626 (1943).
Stealing of purse which was 1 Vfc feet from
owner was not grand larceny in absence of proof
of value. SUte •. Lucsro, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498
P.2d 350 (1972).
For purposes of determining the degree of an
offense graded in terms of the value of the
property stolen, the proper measure is the
current market value of the property at the
time and place where the alleged offense was
committed. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah
1977).
Evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that more than $250 had been
stolen from washers and dryers in a coinoperated laundromat where laundromat owner,
who had operated the business for twelve
years, testified that roughly $600 to $800 was
missing based upon estimates from money in
the machines that were not disturbed and the
total amount of money found in defendant's
possession was nearly $600. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).
The prima facie value of a stolen check is its
face value whether the check is endorsed or not
SUte v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981).
Evidence held sufficient to esUblish at least

$260 embezzled by theater manager. SUU v.
Patterson, 700 P. 2d 1104 (Utah 1985).
lb prove market value in a different city, the
cities must be sufficiently close geographically
and similar in population to be considered
comparable for purposes of valuing the property. SUU v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
—Taetimony of owner.
Owner is competent to testify to the value of
stolen property where the owner's opinion of
the value is based on comparable prices for
similar property. SUU v. limb, 581 P.2d 142
(Utah 1978).
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to
give his opinion as to the value of such property.
SUU v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar
with the value of his possessions, an owner is
competent to testify on the present market
value of his property. SUU v. Purceli, 711 R2d
243 (Utah 1985).
Owner's testimony that a stolen ring was
worth $200 was inadmissible, because he had
no independent knowledge or memory of i u
value nor was his memory refreshed after looking at a police report. SUU v. Oliver, 820 P.2d
474 (Utah Ct App. 1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
Cited in SUU v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1986); SUU v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct
App. 1987); SUU v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616
(UtsJi 1987); SUU v. Branch, 743 P. 2d 1187
(Ut*h 1987); SUU v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436
(Ut*h Ct App. 1987); SUU v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
1033 (Utah Ct App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.2<L—»50Am Jur. 2d Larceny 5 44.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 60(1).

Kay Numbers. — Larceny •» 23.

PARTS
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) altors any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) maxes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub*
lishes, or utters any writing so that the Writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
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numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing* includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or
identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953,7*4-601, enacted by L.
1973, eh* 196, I 76-6-601; 1974, ch. 33,1 19;
1975, ch. 63,1 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempting to utter that was of evidentiary value. State
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936).
The crime of attempted forgery involves the
same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d
529 (Utah Ct App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Attempt
Attorney signing client's name.
Authority to use forged signature.
Clsssificttion of document
Defenses.
—Insanity.
—Postdated check.
Elements of offense.
—Making and passing.
—Passing.
—Signature.
Evidence.
—Handwriting.
—Other crimes.
—Sufficient
False pretenses distinguished.
Fictitious name.
Indictment or information.
Intent
"Make* or "utter."
Prescription.
Signature.
—In general.
—Authority to sign another's name.
Standard of proof
Uttering.
Variance.
Verdict
Cited.

Attorney signing client's name.
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attorney to execute documents in the name of a
client does not authorize an attorney to forge a
client's name to a negotiable instrument such
as s settlement check and does not preclude the
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of
law when he does so; however, when an attorney acts pursuant to the general authority
granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).

Attempt.
Where information charging offense of forgery contained one count for forgery and another
for uttering, attempt to utter could be shown.

Authority to use forged signature.
Where defendant forged his accomplices
name on checks which accomplice owned but
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks
and split the proceeds with the accomplice,
defendant committed forgery as denned under
Subsection (lXb), notwithstanding that the accomplice authorized defendant to sign his
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1979).
Classification of document
The trial court erred in concluding that a
"receipt" a document representing that a cua-
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76-6-520, Criminal usury.
(1) A person is guilty of criminal usury when he knowingly engages in or
directly or indirectly providesfinancingfor the business of making loans at a
higher rate of interest or consideration therefor than is authorized by law.
(2) Criminal usury is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-520, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, | 76-6420.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Amu Jur. 2d* — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and
Usury t 357.

C.J.S. — 91 C.J.S. Usury § 160.
Key Numbers. — Usury *• 149.

76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punishment as for theft.
(1) A person commits afraudulentinsurance act if that person with intent
to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains
false orfraudulentinformation concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or
contract;
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the statement or representation contains false orfraudulentinformation concerning any fact or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefitfromproceeds derivedfroma fraudulent
insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false
orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d), is punishable as in
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communicationfraudfor
property of like value.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (1Kb)
through (l)(d) shall be measxired by the total value of all property, money, or
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by thefraudulentinsurance act
or acts described in Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this see1973, ch-196, S 76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, § 13* tion to such an extent that a detailed analysis is
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- impracticable.

336

76-6-702
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76-6-702. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) •Access* means to directly or indirectly use, attempt to use, instruct,
communicate with, cause input to, cause outputfrom,or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, computer system, computer network,
or any means of communication with any of them.
(2) "Computer" means any electronic device or communication facility
with data processing ability.
(3) 'Computer system* means a set of related, connected or unconnected, devices, software, or other related computer equipment
(4) "Computer network* means the interconnection of communication
or telecommunication lines between computers or computers and remote
terminals.'
(5) "Computer property* includes, but is not limited to, electronic
impulses, electronically produced data, information, financial instruments, software, or programs, in either machine or human readable form,
any other tangible or intangible item relating to a computer, computer
system, computer network, and copies of any of them.
(6) "Services" include, but are not limited to, computer time, data
manipulation, and storage functions.
(7) "Financial instrument* includes, but is not limited to, any check,
draft, money order, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange,
credit card, or marketable security.
(8) "Software* or "program* means a series of instructions or statements
in a form acceptable to a computer, relating to the operations of the
computer, or permitting the functioning of a computer system in a manner
designed to provide results including, but not limited to, system control
programs, application programs, or copies of any of them.
History: L. 1979, ch. 75, | 2; 1986, ch. 128,
12.

76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties.
(1) A person who gains or attempts to gain access to and without authorization intentionally, and to the damage of another, alters, damages, destroys,
discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer property,
computer system, program, or software is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) A person who intentionally and without authorization uses a computer,
computer network, computer property, or computer system to gain or attempt
to gain access to any other computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software, to the damage of another, and alters,
damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any of these, is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
(3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any
computer, computer network, computer property, or computer system, program, or software to devise or execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to
obtain money, property, services, or other things of value by false pretenses,
promises, or representations, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
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(4) A person who intentionally, and without authorization, interferes with or
interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(5) A person who intentionally and without authorization damages or
destroys, in whole or in part, any computer, computer network, computer
property, or computer system is guilty of a class A misdemeanor unless tie
amount of damage exceeds $1,000, in which case the person is guilty of a felony
of the third degree.
^
History: C. IMS, 76-4-708, enacted by L.
1986, ch* 1*3,1 S.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws

1986, ch. 123, } 3 repeal* | 76-6-703, as e *
acted IqrUwt 1979, ch. 75, t 3, and enacu t h |
above section.
^

76-6-704. Attorney general, county attorney, or district]
attorney to prosecute — Conduct violating other"
statutes.
\
(1) The attorney general, district attorney, or the county attorney shgll
prosecute suspected criminal violations of this part
(2) Prosecution under this part does not prevent any prosecutions under any
other law.
History: L. 1979, ch. 75,1 4; 1986, ch. 123, ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "district
I 4; 1993, ch. 33,1 77.
attorney" in Subsection (1).
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-

76-6-705. Reporting violations.
Every person, except those to whom a statutory or common law privilege
applies, who has reason to believe that the provisions of Section 76-6-703 are
being or have been violated shall report the suspected violation to the attorney
general, or county attorney, or, if within a prosecution district, the district
attorney of the county or prosecution district in which part or all of the
violations occurred
History: C. 1953, 76-6-705, enacted by L.
1936, ch. 123,1 5; 1993, eh. 33,1 73.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend*
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or, if

within a prosecution district the district sttprney" and "or prosecution district" and m%de
stylistic changes,

PART 8
LIBRARY T H E F T
76-6-801. A c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g l i b r a r y t h e f t
A person is guilty of the crime of library theft when he willfully, for thi j
purpose of converting to personal use, and depriving the owner, conceals on hii j
person or among his belongings library materials while on the premises of thl"
library or willfully and without authority removes library materials from the*
library building with the intention of converting them to his own use.
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PART 18
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties*
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or
to obtainfromanother money, property, or anything of value by means of false
orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty oft
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not
exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed
$10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and
(f) afirstdegree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) Tb communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to
talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and
spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
History: C. 1958, 76-10-1801, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 157,1 2; 1990, ch. 79,1 1.
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